Blog Archive

Steven Pinker on “The False Allure of Group Selection”

A recurrent idea in Steven Pinker’s essay is that group selection “adds little to what we have always called ‘history’.” I argue, on the contrary, that cultural multi-level selection (CMLS) provides a highly productive theoretical framework for the study of human history, including (and integrating over) both modeling and empirical approaches. Notable examples developed during the last decade include the evolution of religion (e.g., in the work of David Sloan Wilson and Richard Bellah), the evolution of monogamy (e.g., the work of Joseph Henrich), and my own work on the evolution of social complexity. It is worth noting that I came to CMLS indirectly. My own research has focused on the mechanisms that underlie the rise – and recurrent demise – of historical large-scale societies (‘megaempires’), and so far I found no other framework that could even approach the utility of CMLS.

Large-scale human societies are not simply undifferentiated ensembles of individuals. They are ‘segmentary’ in the anthropological jargon, that is, their internal structure can be represented as groups nested within groups nested within groups … and so on. In other words, human societies are truly multilevel entities and evolution of large-scale sociality in humans was not just one major evolutionary transition, but a whole cascade of them. In order for societies to exist without fragmenting, forces holding together groups at various levels must overcome centrifugal tendencies (and when they fail to do so, the result is a failed state). A major theoretical result in MLS is the Price equation, which specifies the conditions under which the balance shifts either toward integration, or disintegration.

Cultural traits of central interest are prosocial norms and institutions (for more on this, see recent articles by Peter Richerson, Sam Bowles, and others). They are critical for the stability and functioning of large-scale societies, but have very significant costs at lower levels of social organization. Thus, we have a typical multilevel situation, in which traits are under divergent selective pressures acting at different levels of organization.

CMLS is much more than a metaphor, it yields quantitative predictions that can be (and have been) tested with historical data. The Price equation includes not only coefficients of selective pressures (working against each other at lower vs. higher levels), but also cultural variances at two (or more) levels. Incidentally, the critical importance of variances is a new insight for most social scientists, not steeped in evolutionary theory. But we can go beyond such conceptual insights to empirical applications. In particular, the Price equation suggests that large states should arise in regions where culturally very different people are in contact, and where interpolity competition – warfare – is particularly intense.

In a recent article, I tested this prediction for the period of human history between 500 BCE and 1500 CE, and found a very good match between predictions and data. A further development of this approach is the current collaborative project with Tom Currie, Edward Turner, and Sergey Gavrilets. We have developed an agent-based model of cultural evolution of prosocial institutions on a realistic landscape (Afroeurasia between 1500 BCE and 1500 CE). We also quantified the spatiotemporal distribution of historical large-scale societies by counting how frequently each 100 × 100 km square found itself within a large territorial polity. Our results indicate that the model predicts over 60 percent of variance in the data, a level of precision practically unheard of in historical applications.

Thus, the theoretical framework of CMLS provides not only new conceptual insights into the study of human history, but it also guides empirical research and, most notably, yields predictions that exhibit an excellent match with data.

A note:

This is a draft of a commentary that I intend to submit to The Edge, where Steven Pinker's essay was published. I would really appreciate any comments. The commentary is a bit too long (600 instead of 500 words), so suggestions on which pieces are not critical would also be very welcome.

An additional note:

After posting the commentary I discovered the "Editorial Marching Orders" for publishing comments at the Edge, which specifically prohibits 'self-promotion'. As my counter-example to Pinker's claim that group selection adds little to the study of human history relies on my own work, this disqualifies my comment for the Edge. So I will have to either rethink my commentary, or simply not bother submitting it to the Edge. In any case, I remain very interested in comments from all.

A (hopefully) final note:

I have now heard that the restriction against referring to own works has been relaxed, so from this point of view, my commentary should be OK after additional editing.

Blog Archive Comments 9 comments Comments originally published with this post. This archive is read-only.
  1. Yasha Hartberg

    I think this is an excellent reply, Peter, and very interesting. It's already quite concise, so it's hard to know what to edit. Perhaps you could leave out the paragraph beginning, "Cultural traits of central interest?" That wouldn't get you under 500 words, but it would get you closer to your goal.

    1. Peter Turchin

      Yasha, thanks. It looks like the word limit has been lifted, so current length is OK. In fact, I am thinking of adding a bit more on Pinker's 'grand deception' theory, and on the evolution of monogamy (unless Joe Henrich decides to do it himself).

  2. David Sloan Wilson

    I also like this reply, Peter, and I'm glad that you're addressing what Steve said about history. For me, the statement that "group selection adds little to what we have always called history" is like saying "evolution adds little to what we have always called the fossil record". Both recorded human history and the biological fossil record are bodies of information that require theoretical frameworks to be understood. The study of human history lacks of theoretical framework, and evolutionary theory provides one. Steve's comments about history go beyond group selection. I think he has a hard time thinking about cultural evolution in general, multilevel or otherwise. He thinks that if psychological processes are involved, such as intentional decision-making, it no longer qualifies as evolution.

    1. Peter Turchin

      David: It looks like several of us will be taking Steven to task for his unreasonable requirement that variation has to be generated purely randomly. It's not in the basic Darwinian postulates!

  3. Mark Sloan

    Peter, I have followed your blog for a while, and thought I would try posting. I like your response to Pinker, but I had a different perspective. It seems to me that his focus on “natural selection” only behaviors creates a straw horse version of multi-level selection to attack. For example, he ground rules out any counterexamples that are not based on “natural selection”. (I understand him to mean by “natural selection” something like selection without intent, or random selection, based only on reproductive fitness.) This ground rule removes from consideration some of multi-level selections best supporting data: results of group selection experiments, which are almost inevitably based on the intent of the investigator, and enforced cultural norms (moral standards) within groups including nation states. Pinker ground rules out cultural norms because they are both chosen based on people’s intent, and are selected for by many benefits of increased cooperation, not necessarily reproductive fitness. Also, the expansion of the definition of kin-selection to be favoritism based on something like association, rather than actual genetic kinship, sounds like people tying themselves in intellectual knots in order to avoid multi-level selection. Finally, the EO Wilson quote about "In a group, selfish individuals beat altruistic individuals” Is not a necessary part of multilevel selection theory as I understand it, and indeed may not even be a mainstream position in multi-level selection theory. Certainly, it is easy to argue that in environments where individuals punish bad behavior against them – as all social mammals do – evolutionary game theory shows that altruism readily can spontaneously appear and sustain itself as in tit for tat and more sophisticated direct reciprocity strategies. I expect the differences of opinion on the EO Wilson quote are due to different understandings of punishment of bad behavior and how ubiquitous a part of the environment for group living mammals it is. While I expect multilevel selection can be robustly defended even with Pinker’s ground-rule of only “natural selection” examples, an alternative response would be to point out the crippled straw horse version of multi-level selection he is arguing against.

    1. Peter Turchin

      Mark, I entirely agree. Rather than fight the fight according to the ground rules set by Pinker, we should change the rules. In fact, that is what I do in my commentary. As I just wrote in an e-mail to David Wilson, we can point out that Pinker is not a specialist in this area, and we can write detailed critiques of his reasoning (there is a lot to criticize), but ultimately cultural MLS is going to win not on the strength of such critiques, but by showing that it is a productive research program.

    2. tmtyler

      Kin selection acting on memes is simply an obvious application of the theory. In the development of evolutionary theory, group selection explanations come first, and are then obliterated by the far more practical and useful kin selection methodologies. Group selection is OK in theory, but in practice it seems to lack family values.

  4. Mark Sloan

    That is, straw man argument, rather than straw horse!

    1. Peter Turchin

      Actually, I kinda like the straw horse metaphor!

Connections

Related work

Book

The Great Holocene Transformation

Sep 17, 2025Turchin, P.

What Complexity Science Tells Us about the Evolution of Complex Societies

Why do the 99.9% of humanity live in large-scale societies organized as states? During the Holocene (the last 10,000 years), human societies have been transformed utterly: from small groups of nomadic foragers to our current interconnected world of large-scale societies organized as states. Population numbers, agricultural productivity, technological…

Beresta BooksSocial ComplexityCooperation
Book

Ultrasociety

Nov 17, 2015Turchin, P.

Cooperation is powerful

We organize ourselves into communities of hundreds of millions of individuals, inhabit every continent, and send people into space. Human beings are nature’s greatest team players. And the truly astounding thing is, we only started our steep climb to the top of the rankings—overtaking wasps, bees, termites and ants—in the last 10,000 years. Genetic…

Beresta BooksCooperationCultural Evolution
Book

Figuring Out the Past: The 3,495 Vital Statistics that Explain World History

Nov 17, 2020Turchin, P., Hoyer, D.

Discover the world records that define our history and jump headfirst into the past using scientific data that reveals accurate and insightful answers to life’s biggest questions.

What was history's biggest empire? Or the tallest building of the ancient world? What was the plumbing like in medieval Byzantium? The average wage in the Mughal Empire? Where did scientific writing first emerge? What was the bloodiest ever ritual human sacrifice? We are used to thinking about history in terms of stories. Yet we understand our own world…

PublicAffairsHistorical DatabasesCliodynamics
Publication

The Puzzle of Human Ultrasociality: How Did Large-Scale Complex Societies Evolve?

Oct 1, 2013Turchin, P.

After a long and turbulent history, the study of human cultural evolution is finally becoming comparable to the study of genetic evolution, with human history the counterpart of the biological fossil record. One of the most remarkable products of cultural evolution has been an increase in the scale of human societies by many orders of magnitude. Today, the great majority of humans live in complex societies, which can only exist due to extensive cooperation among large numbers of individuals. Ultrasociality, the ability of humans to cooperate in large groups of genetically unrelated individuals, presents a puzzle to both evolutionary and social theory. Although much theoretical effort has been devoted to understanding the evolution of cooperation in small-scale groups (hunter-gatherers living in societies of hundreds to a few thousand individuals), the same cannot be said about the next phase of human evolution, the rise of complex societies encompassing tens and hundreds of millions of people. Evolutionary biologists, political scientists, anthropologists, and others have proposed a multitude of theories to explain how complex societies evolved. However, scientific study has suffered from two limitations. First, with a few exceptions, theories have relied on verbal reasoning; formal models tend to focus on the evolution of cooperation in small groups, whereas the transition from small- to large-scale societies has been mostly neglected. Second, there has been no systematic effort to compare theoretical predictions to data. Human ultrasociality has evolved repeatedly around the world and across time, reflecting both common selection pressures and the unique contingencies affecting each case. An enormous amount of archaeological and historical information exists but has not been studied from an evolutionary perspective. Thus, explicit models that will yield specific and quantitative predictions are needed as well as databases of the cultural evolution of human ultrasociality. Furthermore, a research program combining explicit models with empirical testing of predictions is not only an academic endeavor. Understanding conditions that either promote or inhibit human ultrasociality is highly relevant for addressing the challenges of large-scale cooperation and conflict in the modern world. Published in the Strungmann Forum Reports Series.

Cultural EvolutionCultural EvolutionSocial Complexity
Publication

What is society?

Jul 9, 2026Turchin, P.

This article engages with Mark Moffett’s proposed definition of society, which emphasizes shared group identification over social interaction, and argues for a different, problem-driven approach to definition in evolutionary social science. Rather than treating definitions as primary, I situate them within the broader research agenda aimed at explaining the Great Holocene Transformation—the dramatic expansion of human societies in scale and complexity over the past 10,000 years. My central analytical focus is on cooperation: the capacity of individuals to coordinate actions toward collective goals despite incentives to free-ride. Accordingly, society is defined here as a collective of individuals engaged in sustained cooperation, with interest group proposed as a more flexible and analytically useful term. Within this framework, polities represent a key subtype of interest groups, characterized by their role as independent political units whose persistence depends on maintaining cooperative cohesion, particularly among elites. Other commonly cited features of societies—such as group identification, territoriality, and intergenerational continuity—are treated as secondary mechanisms that support cooperation rather than defining properties. Ultimately, I argue that flexible, operational definitions are most valuable at intermediate stages of scientific inquiry, where they facilitate the construction and empirical testing of theoretical models.

Theory and SocietyCooperationSocial Complexity
Publication

Social complexity promotes cooperation and functional integration in large-scale societies

May 29, 2026Sandeford, D. S., Turchin, P., Hamilton, M. J., et al.

How do large-scale human societies maintain functional integration? Over the last 12,000 years, polities grew over six orders of magnitude in population, far exceeding the scale at which the interpersonal mechanisms that promote cooperation in small-scale societies can operate. Here we test the hypothesis that cooperation and functional integration in large-scale societies is promoted by social (and, specifically, institutional) complexity. We model large-scale societies as territorial social networks subject to energetic, cognitive, and competitive constraints. We demonstrate that agricultural intensification generates increasing population density, raising the per capita rate of social interaction beyond what small-scale mechanisms can sustain and requiring institutional rules to substitute for interpersonal knowledge. The model predicts that territory and social complexity scale with polity population with exponents of 5/6 and 1/6. Tests against data describing hundreds of polities spanning the Holocene support these predictions, providing quantitative evidence that social complexity is a central integrative mechanism enabling large-scale human cooperation.

SocArXivSocial ComplexityCooperation